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Abstract
A classic issue in political science is how the size of political entities affects democracy. We
argue that municipal size may affect local internal political efficacy negatively in two ways: first,
as existing studies show, greater distance between citizens and politicians in large municipalities
may diminish citizens’ belief in their ability to influence politics. Second, it may cause greater in-
equality in internal political efficacy for different social groups. We use the comprehensive Danish
structural reform of 2007 to examine the latter issue in a way that solves various methodologi-
cal problems associated with cross sectional analysis of size effects. It turns out that there is no
unequivocal development in the inequality of different social groups’ sense of efficacy. Hence,
although increased size leads to decreased internal political efficacy generally, it does not system-
atically increase inequality.
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Introduction1 
One of the strengths of local democracy is the fact that it is local. It is in the mu-
nicipalities that citizens experience the greatest closeness to politicians. For ex-
ample, citizens feel that local politicians are more receptive and responsive than 
politicians in the national parliament and at the EU level (Andersen, 2000). With 
the Danish structural reform of 2007, 239 of the 271 old municipalities became 
less local in the sense that they became larger, in terms of population as well as 
area. The question is whether this has affected the local democracy. 
 A longer distance between politicians and citizens may have implications 
for several aspects of local democracy. First, the growing distance can have con-
sequences for the citizens’ belief in their own possibilities to influence local poli-
tics, i.e. their internal political efficacy. One reason is that more citizens compete 
for attention and influence in large municipalities, another reason is that political 
processes work under different conditions in small units with less than 10,000 
inhabitants, which was fairly common in the old municipal structure (128 such 
municipalities existed in 2006; only four in 2009), and in larger political systems 
with over 55,000 inhabitants, which is the average municipal size after the reform. 
In the small units, political issues are typically tangible and concern conditions in, 
for example, a specific school, known by a large share of the citizens. In large 
units, political issues are more abstract and involve institutions that are unknown 
to the vast majority of citizens. Under such conditions, citizens may find it diffi-
cult to gain influence on local politics. 
 This can have two consequences for internal political efficacy: (1) Internal 
political efficacy may generally decline due to increases in size of municipalities. 
Previous work has shown that this happened as a result of the Danish amalgama-
tions (Lassen and Serritzlew, 2011). (2) The changes may cause greater inequality 
in internal political efficacy for different social groups. It may, for example, well 
be that the gap in political efficacy between citizens with high and low education 
increases when political systems become larger. The aim of this article is to test 
this possible effect. 
 The article starts with a theoretical discussion of the relationship between 
size and internal political efficacy. Next, the effect of municipal size on inequality 
in internal political efficacy for different groups is investigated by analyzing the 
effects of increases in population size resulting from the Danish structural reform.  
 
 
  
                                                 
1 We would like to thank Poul Erik Mouritzen for providing us with access to his data on internal 
political efficacy before the structural reform. Annette B. Andersen provided valuable help in 
translating the article from Danish. 
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Size and internal political efficacy 
 
Internal political efficacy is a classic concept.2 It originates from Campbell, Gurin 
and Miller’s (1954) study of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s victory over Adlai Steven-
son in the 1952 American presidential election: “Sense of political efficacy may 
be defined as the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an 
impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worth while to perform one’s civic 
duties” (1954: 187). Their goal was to examine different conditions that might 
affect the degree of political activity. It turned out that the sense of efficacy is 
positively associated with political participation, also when controlling for gender, 
age and education (1954: 191). A few years later, the concept was used in Al-
mond and Verba’s The Civic Culture, which shows that sense of political efficacy 
also increases satisfaction with participation in the political process (Almond and 
Verba, 1989 [1963]: 193). 
 The two studies measured and defined the concept in slightly different 
ways. Niemi, Craig and Mattei (1991: 1407) show that it is critical to distinguish 
between two dimensions. Internal political efficacy is “beliefs about one’s own 
competence to understand, and to participate effectively in, politics,” whereas 
external political efficacy is about responsiveness. Here, we focus on internal po-
litical efficacy, measured by a variant of Niemi, Craig and Mattei’s operationali-
zation (see Lassen and Serritzlew, 2011: 240), which has become standard in 
American and comparative studies (cf., e.g., Niemi, Craig and Mattei, 1991: 1408; 
Hayes and Bean, 1993; Morrell, 2003). In Danish studies, Lolle (2003) uses the 
classic American operationalization, whereas Andersen (2000: 127-9) develops a 
series of other questions. Table 1 shows the four questions on which the index of 
internal political efficacy is based. The wordings correspond to Lolle (2003). The 
questions are translated from Niemi, Craig and Mattei (1991: 1408), and adapted 
to Danish municipal conditions. The table shows that the internal political effica-
cy is balanced. Except for the item on understanding political issues, where the 
vast majority indicates that they have a good understanding, the number of citi-
zens with a high and a low sense of political efficacy is quite similar.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
2 For a thorough introduction to the concept and its measurement (in Danish), see Andersen 
(2000). 
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Table 1: Internal political efficacy in Danish municipalities after the structural 
reform (percent).  
 
Disagree
completely
Disagree
partially
Neither 
disagree 
nor agree
Agree 
partially
Agree 
completely N 
I consider myself to be well 
qualified to participate in politics 
25.2 17.1 25.1 16.8 15.9 1,065 
I feel that I have a pretty good 
understanding of the important 
political issues facing my 
municipality 
3.8 5.5 20.4 40.5 29.9 1,065 
I feel that I could do as good a job 
in public office as most other 
people 
21.1 19.2 26.2 14.7 18.9 1,065 
How well informed do you think 
you are in terms of what happens 
in local politics in your 
municipality?* 
5.2 18.2 39.4 27.2 10.1 1,065 
Source: Telephone interviews. See KREVI (2009: 10). 
* The response categories are here very well informed, well informed, fairly well informed, 
slightly informed, and not at all informed. Respondents answering “don’t know” are omitted from 
this analysis, and comprise around 0.5 percent of the sample. 
 
 The question is now how the formation of new, large municipalities after 
the reform affects the sense of political efficacy. The size of a political unit may 
affect democracy in many ways. Dahl and Tufte (1973: 13-16) have identified 23 
different claims in the literature about how this can happen. We will here take a 
close look at a few of them (see Lassen and Serritzlew, 2011 for a more compre-
hensive discussion). 
 The first claim is that it is easier in practice to gain effective influence in 
smaller units. There are two reasons for this. First, fewer citizens compete for 
political positions, agenda setting and influencing the political process. The num-
ber of local politicians per 1,000 inhabitants (measured as members of the munic-
ipal council) drops when municipal size increases, from almost five in the smal-
lest municipalities to less than one half in the large municipalities, both in the old 
municipal structure (Serritzlew and Thomsen, 2004: 48) and in the new.3 Compe-
tition for attention and mandates thus differs by a factor of 10 between large and 
small municipalities. It is, therefore, likely that citizens find it more difficult to 
gain influence on local politics in larger municipalities. 
 Second, it may also be important whether citizens know their politicians. 
Knowing other active citizens is one of the most important reasons for individual 
citizens’ political participation (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993: 644; 650-1). Like-
                                                 
3 Source: Table BEF1A07 and VALGK3 in StatBank Denmark. 
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wise, a study of political participation in the US shows that citizens with larger 
networks of politically interested to a higher extent participate actively in politics 
(La Due Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998: 580). Hence, it is likely to matter whether 
citizens have local politicians in their network. Figure 1 shows, based on simple 
assumptions, the relationship between municipal size and the likelihood of having 
a personal connection to a local politician. Regardless of municipal size, very few 
citizens have politicians in their immediate circle of acquaintances. This is shown 
by the circles in Figure 1, which indicate the likelihood that there is a politician 
among your 20 closest acquaintances. Obviously, the likelihood of having a poli-
tician among your acquaintances drops as municipal size increases, but it is never 
very high. However, if we take a look at citizens’ networks, the differences be-
tween small and large units are marked. The x’s in Figure 1 represent the likeli-
 in your network. It is almost certain in the smallest 
municipalities, whereas the likelihood drops to around 20 percent in municipali-
ties with 50,000 inhabitants. In other words, an important difference between 
small and large municipalities is that in the smallest municipalities you can be 
almost sure to have at least one local politician among close acquaintances and 
their acquaintances, whereas this is only true for very few inhabitants of large 
municipalities. This may very well affect internal political efficacy. 
Figure 1: The likelihood of knowing a politician 
 
Note: The likelihoods are calculated for 2007 data on population and number local councilors. The 
calculation is based on one citizen with 20 close acquaintances who live in the municipality. The 
network includes 20 close acquaintances for each acquaintance. Likelihoods are calculated accord-
ing to the hyper geometric distribution (extraction without replacement). The calculations are 
based on the assumption that the likelihood of having politicians among one’s acquaintances is 
equal for all citizens. The figure only shows municipalities with less than 100,000 inhabitants. In 
the largest municipalities, the likelihoods are correspondingly lower. 
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The other reason to expect size to affect internal political efficacy is that local 
politics works in different ways in large and small municipalities. Verba and Nie 
(1972) argue that politics in large units is more impersonal, distant and compli-
cated, whereas citizens in smaller units are more aware of what is going on, have 
better opportunities to organize and have better knowledge about who to contact 
to gain influence: “In the small town, the community is a manageable size. Citi-
zens can know each other so that they can form political groups. In the larger ci-
ties, politics is more complicated, impersonal, and distant” (1972: 231). In Danish 
municipalities, local party lists constitute a good example of such differences be-
tween large and small units. Local party lists are strongly represented in the small 
municipalities, both under the old municipal structure (Serritzlew and Thomsen, 
2004: 51) and under the new structure where the average share of local party list 
mandates in the municipal council drops gradually from approx. 30 percent in 
municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants to 0 percent in municipalities with 
more than 100,000 inhabitants.4 Local party lists are the local version of national 
political parties. Many of them are formed because of a specific issue or are based 
in a special geographic area. As they do not all have political programs, they do 
not necessarily have an established stance on many political issues. For example, 
almost half of the representatives in the local party lists in the smallest munici-
palities find that it does not make sense to place their party list on a right/left scale 
(Serritzlew and Thomsen, 2004: 53). The local party lists thus offer an opportuni-
ty to participate in another type of politics than the local chapters of the national 
parties. Hence, contrary to many large municipalities, citizens in small ones can 
choose between two fundamentally different types of parties. This means that 
citizens who find it easier to gain influence via the more concrete and specific 
agenda of a local party list lose a channel of influence when the municipality 
grows larger. A possible outcome is a decline in internal political efficacy.  
 Such effects are hard to study. Cross sectional data, i.e., comparisons of 
units of different sizes, is often not sufficient to rule out that internal political effi-
cacy is affected by other, and in this context irrelevant, factors that also vary be-
tween units. The problem can be solved partially by statistical control, but it is 
impossible to ensure that all relevant variables are included in the analysis. How-
ever, as we argue in the methods section below, the structural reform can be seen 
as a quasi experiment. Based on this, Lassen and Serritzlew (2011) show that 
population size has a causal detrimental effect on citizens’ internal political effi-
cacy. In the following, we argue that population size may also affect inequality in 
internal political efficacy between different social groups.  
 Citizens’ socioeconomic characteristics are in two ways important for in-
ternal political efficacy. First, earlier studies show that especially age, gender, 
                                                 
4 Source: See note 3. 
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education and income have substantial effects on political efficacy (Almond and 
Verba, 1989; Hayes and Bean, 1993: 269-70). People with low education are less 
engaged in politics, and a larger share thinks that “politics is so complicated that 
people like me don’t really understand what’s going on” (Andersen, 2003: 116).  
 Second, certain groups may be particularly at risk when politics becomes 
less concrete (see Harrits, 2009). For example, the inequality in internal political 
efficacy between, e.g., highly educated and less educated citizens may become 
larger when size increases. Such differences in internal political efficacy between 
social groups are problematic in and of themselves. According to Dahl’s ideals, it 
is not enough that citizens have sufficient opportunity to gain influence; equal 
opportunity for citizens is also crucial (1989: 114-15). Access to influence should, 
according to Dahl, not depend on who you are, your education, gender, employ-
ment status or income. If increasing population size causes differences between 
social groups in internal political efficacy, this is an important democratic prob-
lem. In Dahl’s words (1989: 115), equal opportunity of influence is an ideal “so 
demanding, indeed, that the criteria for the democratic process would require a 
people committed to it to institute measures well beyond those that even the most 
democratic states have hitherto brought about.” If larger population size increases 
this inequality, we move away from Dahl’s conception of the ideal democracy.  
 Municipal size may affect the inequality in internal political efficacy be-
tween several different types of groups. Below we examine education, gender, 
age, public employment and income. This question has not been thoroughly in-
vestigated in the literature. The general tendency is that education has a larger 
effect on feelings of efficacy in relation to the national level and the EU level than 
at the local level (Andersen, 2000: 144). This indicates that equality is actually 
greater in units that are close to the citizens. However, this does, of course, not 
necessary imply that inequality is smallest in small municipalities. Lolle (2003) 
mentions, based on a cross sectional analysis, that the effect of education on in-
ternal political efficacy is not dependent on municipal size. Hence, existing results 
point in different directions. 
 
Methods and design: the Danish structural reform 
 
As suggested above, studying size effects with cross sectional data is associated 
with methodological problems. One reason is that there may be considerable dif-
ferences between large and small municipalities. The problem can be reduced by 
statistical control. But if important variables are unknown, not measurable or only 
partially measurable, observed and estimated differences in internal political effi-
cacy between large and small municipalities may be due to factors that are irrele-
vant to the analysis. 
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 Another reason is a serious endogeneity problem in cross sectional analys-
es. Citizens are not randomly distributed in municipalities, but settle based on 
what the municipalities can offer (Oates, 1969; Kristensen, 2002; Banzhaf and 
Walsh, 2008) and citizens with special preferences for participation in local poli-
tics may therefore choose to live in municipalities fitting their wishes. This im-
plies that it cannot be ruled out that correlations between municipal size and in-
ternal political efficacy are subject to a reverse effect, namely that citizens choose 
to settle in different municipalities depending on their own level of internal politi-
cal efficacy. 
 The structural reform offers an exceptionally favorable opportunity to 
handle these two problems. The municipal amalgamations imply that individuals 
in a large number of municipalities experience a change from living in a small 
municipality to living in a large municipality. As a result, all possible irrelevant 
factors that could bias estimates are held constant. Nor are there any endogeneity 
problems since no individual citizens have had noteworthy influence on the final 
size of the new municipality (in contrast to the source of the endogeneity problem 
in cross sectional analyses, namely that citizens have great influence on where 
they choose to live in the first place).  
 The next section examines internal political efficacy in a number of muni-
cipalities in two studies, one before and one after the reform. Internal political 
efficacy is measured by the survey questions listed in Table 1. The first study was 
conducted in 2001,5 i.e. before any considerations of a structural reform took 
form. The second study was conducted after the municipal reform. The choice of 
timing of this study is a reflection of two issues: (1) In the wake of the reform, 
municipalities were encouraged to focus on local democracy (Ministry of the Inte-
rior and Social Affairs, 2009). Such initiatives, which may aim to counter possible 
negative democratic effects of the municipal amalgamations, would disturb the 
analysis of the effect of municipal size on political efficacy. The problem can be 
solved by conducting the analysis relatively soon after the reform. (2) A possible 
effect of the reform is that citizens immediately after the reform find local politics 
quite confusing because of the radical changes in municipal tasks and municipal 
boundaries. Based on a study of the formation of the Regional Municipality of 
Bornholm in 2003, Kjær (2006: 40) concludes that “the perception of individual 
possibilities of influence has improved marginally over the two-year period [since 
the regional municipality was formed].” We tackle this dilemma in two ways. 
First, if internal political efficacy declines exclusively due to uncertainty caused 
by radical changes after the reform, the decline can be observed in all municipali-
ties. It is less likely that a decline due to uncertainty is systematically dependent 
on how much larger a municipality has become. We therefore investigate not only 
                                                 
5 The data from 2001 is part of the Size and Democracy study (cf. Kjær and Mouritzen, 2003).  
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whether internal political efficacy is lower in amalgamated municipalities, but 
also whether it is related to how much the municipality has grown. Second, citi-
zens in amalgamated as well as non-amalgamated municipalities are affected by 
the structural reform. Examining how the development in political efficacy differs 
between these two groups gives us a picture of how large a share of the change in 
political efficacy is caused by an increase in municipal size. The study was there-
fore timed for one year after the implementation of the new municipal structure, 
i.e. the turn of the year 2007/2008. In the 2001 study an identical number of res-
pondents were randomly selected in 60 of the then 275 municipalities (Houlberg 
and Pedersen, 2003: 209). Since the purpose is to compare the responses in the 
two studies, the relevant questions were repeated with the same wording to citi-
zens in a selection of the 60 municipalities (see also Lassen and Serritzlew, 2011). 
 Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the variables included in the ana-
lyses. Note that the average of internal political efficacy has dropped from 13.5 
before the reform to 12.8 after, and the differences in especially respondents’ edu-
cation in the two studies are surprisingly large. One reason may be that this - and 
other socio economic variables - in the 2001 study were gathered from the nation-
al register, while all variables in the 2008 were measured via survey questions.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 Before reform After reform 
 N Avg. Std.dev Min. Max. N Avg. Std.dev. Min Max.
Long-term further educa-
tion 
963 0.09 0.28 0 1 1,065 0.12 0.33 0 1
Income (in categories) 963 2.82 1.20 1 5 1,065 2.68 1.27 1 5
Public employee 963 0.37 0.48 0 1 1,065 0.25 0.43 0 1
Gender (1 = female) 963 0.47 0.50 0 1 1,065 0.50 0.50 0 1
Age 963 47.77 13.69 17 91 1,065 54.25 14.69 24 95
Internal political efficacy 963 13.47 3.69 5 20 1,065 12.78 3.26 4 20
Note: Internal political efficacy is an additive index consisting of the four variables in Table 1. 
 
Analysis 
 
The basic idea of the research design is to combine the exogenous shock to mu-
nicipal size due to the reform with repeated cross sectional data from the two stu-
dies. We can use this design in a so-called difference-in-difference (DiD) analysis 
to estimate the causal effect of municipal size on internal political efficacy. Indi-
viduals in reform municipalities after the reform are compared with individuals in 
the same municipalities before the reform, and likewise for individuals in non-
merged municipalities. These two differences are then subtracted from each other. 
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The DiD method can thus be understood as a combination of a before-after esti-
mator and a cross sectional estimator. 
 In regression analyses, in general and here, a number of – rarely explicated 
– assumptions must be fulfilled for the results to be interpreted as valid causal 
relations. We expand the traditional DiD method with a so-called matching pro-
cedure, explained in detail in Lassen and Serritzlew (2011). This softens the oth-
erwise relatively strict assumptions behind the DiD method, and makes it more 
reasonable for us to interpret the calculated estimates as representing actual causal 
relations. In other words, such an analysis results in an estimate of the average, 
causal treatment effect of the structural reform. It is obvious, however, that an 
average potentially may comprise large differences in individual effects. In Las-
sen and Serritzlew (2011) we look at one such possible cause of differences in 
treatment effects: the change in population in connection with the municipal mer-
gers. We find that individuals who are exposed to large population changes expe-
rience a marked decline in sense of efficacy. As described above, results based on 
averages may still conceal that the individual effects of the structural reform may 
differ across the individual level variables gender, public vs. private employment, 
age, education and income. 
 We conduct two sets of analyses: First, we examine whether the average 
effects on local internal political efficacy caused by the reform differ across these 
categories. Next, we examine whether the previously identified effect of changes 
in population on sense of efficacy is dependent on these categories, that is, wheth-
er the effect of population change is different for men and women etc. This is 
done by expanding the DiD analysis described above by splitting the treatment 
interaction variable in two; for gender we thus estimate the effect of the structural 
reform separately for men and women. In both sets of analyses, we test for coeffi-
cient equality across categories. 
 In Table 3, each column lists the results of a regression. Column (1) in the 
top panel shows the results of the total structural reform, without conditioning on 
changes in municipal population or individual traits, and thus corresponds exactly 
to the key results in the analyses in Lassen and Serritzlew (2011, table 4) and, 
qualitatively, a study based on the same data conducted by the Danish Evaluation 
Institute for Local Government (KREVI, 2009).6 Based on our estimates, the 
causal effect of the reform, measured one year after the actual merger, is a decline 
in local internal political efficacy of 1.2 (on a 4-20 scale). This is statistically sig-
nificant. In comparison, a simple calculation of the change in internal political 
efficacy before and after the reform based on averages from Table 2 shows a drop 
                                                 
6 The results presented in KREVI (2009) and an earlier Danish-language version of this article are 
qualitatively similar to the results presented here, but the exact estimates differ slightly, due to a 
difference in the matching procedure. This procedure we use here is identical to that used in Las-
sen and Serritzlew (2011). 
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of approx. 0.7, and a DiD analysis without matching (not shown here; see Lassen 
and Serritzlew, 2011: 249) estimates a drop of 0.48. In this case, simple standard 
methods thus underestimate the effect considerably, and our analysis indicates 
that the actual causal effect is approximately twice that of the simple estimates. 
  
Table 3: Effects of the structural reform on internal efficacy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Merged municipality 0.551 0.551 0.551 0.551 0.551 0.551 
[0.606] [0.606] [0.606] [0.606] [0.606] [0.606] 
After reform, A -0.414 0.552 -0.28 -2.062** -0.645 -0.027 
[0.351] [0.531] [0.582] [0.809] [0.458] [0.345] 
After reform, B -1.411** -0.779 -0.084 0.33 -1.676** 
[0.639] [0.613] [0.397] [1.172] [0.727] 
DiD x A -1.241**-1.776*** -1.495** 0.12 -1.544*** -1.081** 
[0.521] [0.622] [0.636] [0.896] [0.533] [0.440] 
DiD x B -0.741 -0.551 -1.531*** -0.581 -1.514 
[0.829] [1.087] [0.537] [1.255] [1.110] 
Chi^2 test for identical effect  N/A 0.309 0.500 0.086 0.516 0.725 
A All Men Private empl. Young No further ed. Lowest income
B N/A Women Public empl. Older Further ed. Higher income
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Population change 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 
(1000 persons) [0.118] [0.118] [0.118] [0.118] [0.118] [0.118] 
After reform, A -0.545* 0.276 -0.475 -2.094*** -0.847** -0.183 
[0.305] [0.500] [0.507] [0.669] [0.427] [0.307] 
After reform, B -1.420*** -0.707 -0.264 0.497 -1.769*** 
[0.527] [0.521] [0.360] [0.723] [0.551] 
Population change x A -0.275** -0.348** -0.323** 0.041 -0.325** -0.216** 
[0.111] [0.151] [0.144] [0.213] [0.140] [0.099] 
Population change x B -0.203 -0.181 -0.331*** -0.235 -0.364* 
[0.208] [0.261] [0.124] [0.200] [0.219] 
Chi^2 test for identical effect       N/A 0.580 0.662 0.090 0.720 0.507 
Note: N = 1532, matched random sample. Each numbered column shows results from a regres-
sion. The top panel shows results from analyses where merged municipalities are binary coded 
(merged vs. continuing). The bottom panel shows results where merged municipalities are coded 
continuously, as the absolute change in population. Both panels show conditional effects (group A 
and B respectively as explained between panels). Cluster corrected standard errors, estimated via 
bootstrap, are shown in parentheses under each estimate. Scores for Chi^2 test are p-values. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Columns (2)-(6) in the top panel show the results of an expansion of this analysis 
where we allow the effects of the reform on local internal political efficacy to 
differ for the A and B categories, shown for each column in the center of the ta-
ble. For instance, Column (2) shows the results of conditioning on gender, that is, 
allowing the treatment effect of the reform to differ between genders: the effect 
for men (-1.776) is large and statistically significant, whereas it is lower for wom-
en and insignificant. In other words, the general result, mentioned earlier, that 
inhabitants in amalgamated municipalities have experienced a decline in internal 
political efficacy, is stronger among men. However, the difference between men 
and women is not statistically significant. 
 Columns (3)-(6) show similar (partial) results; the decline in internal polit-
ical efficacy in merged municipalities seems to be concentrated among men, pri-
vate employees, people over 35 (“older” in the table) and people without a tertiary 
education, whereas we trace no difference between the lowest income groups (< 
DKK 200,000/year) and people with higher incomes. However, and more impor-
tantly, the differences between groups are rarely statistically significant; the pri-
mary cause is relatively large estimated standard deviations, which again are 
caused by especially two factors: the matching method, which due to fewer uti-
lized observations yields less precision, and correction for clustered errors in the 
individual municipalities. Thus, the only significant difference across groups in 
the top panel is based on age: those younger than 35 are not affected at all by the 
larger municipalities, while we estimate a significant loss of internal political effi-
cacy for those older than 35. Even this difference is not very robust. For example, 
the difference is insignificant between those younger and older than 50 years. 
 Whereas the top panel considers all merged municipalities as one regard-
less of changes in size, the bottom panel shows the results from a specification 
where treatment is continuous, measured by the absolute change in population 
size (in 10,000s). Column (7) repeats, like column (1), the results from Lassen 
and Serritzlew (2011, table 4)7 and shows that inhabitants in municipalities that 
experience larger population changes report a greater decline in local internal po-
litical efficacy. This implies that the decline in efficacy is not due to the reform, 
but rather, as predicted by, e.g., Dahl and Tufte, that the size of the political unit 
directly affects people’s local internal political efficacy. 
 The results are fairly similar to the results in the top panel; for example, 
among men an increase in population weakens internal political efficacy. This 
effect is significant and larger than the average effect, but it is lower for women, 
actually only slightly more than half, and non-significant. Again, however, the 
difference is not statistically significant, and this is also the case for differences 
between privately and publicly employed, between citizens with and without fur-
                                                 
7 Estimates of standard errors differ slightly. This owes to the fact that standard errors were esti-
mated by bootstrapping. 
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ther education and between the lowest income group and groups with higher in-
comes. Age groups continue to be the sole source of significant differences: the 
consequences of a given change in municipal size due to the reform has no effect 
on young people’s internal political efficacy, while such a change has a larger 
(negative) effect on internal political efficacy among the 35+ group the larger the 
change is. And again, this difference turns out to be statistically insignificant for 
other splits between the young and old group. 
 Changes in local internal political efficacy due to structural or institutional 
changes can be seen as a combination of knowledge about (or awareness of) the 
relevant structural change and the actual change in sense of efficacy precondi-
tioned on (full) awareness of the structural change. When an observed lack of 
change is combined with an observed significantly lower point of departure, 
which is the case, e.g., for the young group, a possible interpretation is that the 
lack of change among young people is due to a low level of awareness about how 
the reform may affect the possibilities of political influence. The opposite conclu-
sion – that young people are fully aware of the consequences of the reform, but 
assess that it will have no effect – seems difficult to sustain considering the signif-
icantly lower sense of efficacy in this group, represented by the coefficient “After 
reform, A” at -2.06 in column (4).8 In comparison, we find no difference in the 
“basis level” for sense of local political efficacy across most other groups in the 
top panel. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Danish structural reform turned small municipalities into an endangered spe-
cies, now only found on small islands. A previous study (Lassen and Serritzlew, 
2011) has shown that this had consequences for democracy. Internal political effi-
cacy is lower in merged municipalities and the decline is larger the more a muni-
cipality’s population has grown. The decline is statistically significant and sub-
stantial. It would be wrong to infer from this that the reform has sent democracy 
into a crisis, but it is a step in the wrong direction and thus a genuine cost of the 
structural reform.9  
                                                 
8 This interpretation is reminiscent of the literature on illusory superiority; people without skills in 
some area not only lack the skills, but also the metacognitive ability to recognize it (Kruger and 
Dunning, 1999). Moreover, it is difficult mathematically to score lower if you start out at a very 
low score on sense of local political efficacy. In the extreme case where you assess your sense of 
local political efficacy to be at a minimum before the reform, the reform cannot lower the score 
any further. 
9 In Lassen and Serritzlew (2011) we also employed another measure of internal political efficacy, 
based on a combination of questions “Complex” and “Understand.” This measure does not involve 
indirect evaluations of the respondent’s organizational and managerial capacity. The substantive 
significance of the estimated effects are considerably larger using this two-component measure. 
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 However, this article shows that changes in municipal size does typically 
not create large differences in internal political efficacy between different social 
groups. One exception, which is not very robust, is that older people perceive a 
significantly greater decline in sense of efficacy than young people. The results 
suggest, although differences are statistically insignificant, that men perceiver a 
greater decline than women, private employees a greater decline than publicly 
employed, and people without further education perceive a greater decline than 
people with such an education. 
 The conclusions about the categories gender and age and the categories 
employment and education differ as gender and age are basically “privileged 
groups” in the sense that they start out with the highest sense of local political 
efficacy (men and 35+) and experience a marked decline due to the structural 
reform. The fact that women and young people experience a smaller decline con-
stitutes a drop in inequality in internal political efficacy due to the reform. This 
must be seen in relation to the categories employment and education. Employ-
ment starts out with a slightly higher level of internal political efficacy among 
public employees. This is reinforced by the relatively larger decline among pri-
vate employees. Likewise, we see a larger decline among people with low educa-
tion, which reinforces the already marked difference in internal political efficacy 
between citizens without and citizens with a longer education. In other words, this 
constitutes an increase in inequality of internal political efficacy. 
 It is thus not quite right to understand inequality in internal political effi-
cacy as a one-dimensional concept; partly because changes in the institutional 
landscape can increase inequality for some groups, while they diminish inequality 
for other groups; partly because reforms by default reduce the general sense of 
internal political efficacy paradoxically may reduce the inequality, at least for 
some groups. Moreover, a general decline in internal political efficacy may also 
shift the overall balance between citizens and politicians, and between citizens 
and bureaucracy, which we will not discuss here, however. To the extent that citi-
zens with low internal political efficacy and influence benefit from more active 
citizens’ local political effort, a general decline in internal political efficacy and 
political influence will hurt all citizens. 
 All in all, the structural reform has caused an unequivocal decline in inter-
nal political efficacy. In that sense, increasing the size of political entities has real 
costs for democracy. In contrast, it is encouraging that there are no clear-cut de-
trimental effects when it comes to inequality. 
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